Grey Power:Towards a Political Economy of Older Voters in the UK by Chrisp, Joe & Pearce, Nick
        
Citation for published version:
Chrisp, J & Pearce, N 2019, 'Grey Power: Towards a Political Economy of Older Voters in the UK', Political
Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.12737
DOI:
10.1111/1467-923X.12737
Publication date:
2019
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Chrisp, J., & Pearce, N. (2019). Grey Power: Towards a
Political Economy of Older Voters in the UK. Political Quarterly. , which has been published in final form at
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1467-923X.12737. This article may be used for non-commercial
purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.
University of Bath
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 17. Oct. 2019
Grey power: towards a political economy of older voters in the UK 
 
Abstract 
The impact of age on voting behaviour and political outcomes has become an issue of 
increasing interest, particularly in the UK. Age divides in voter turnout and political 
preferences have led to claims that age is the ‘new class.’ In this article, we contrast existing 
‘cultural backlash’ and political economy explanations of the age divide in politics, and 
challenge the view that older people are predominantly ‘left behind’, culturally or 
economically. We show that older people have distinct material interests, related to housing 
wealth and pensions’ income, that are visible in their political preferences. We argue for the 
development of a new political economy of age. 
Keywords: Brexit, older voters, patrimonial voting, intergenerational inequality, pensions, 
housing. 
Introduction 
The impact of age on voting behaviour and political outcomes has become an issue of 
increasing interest, particularly in the UK. The 2017 general election saw an unprecedented 
demographic division in the electorate between old and young: exit polls and post-election 
surveys suggested that between 55% and 58% of over 65s voted for the Conservative Party, 
while between 57% and 62% of the under-35s voted for the Labour Party.1 Similar age 
divisions marked voter preferences for Leave or Remain in the 2016 Brexit referendum: older 
voters delivered the narrow majority to ‘Leave’ the EU against the preference to ‘Remain’ of 
most younger voters.  
Meanwhile, in many advanced capitalist economies, including the UK, age-related 
inequalities in wealth have been growing, while levels of welfare state support for retired 
people and the working-age population have diverged. In the UK, the basic state pension and 
allowances for older people have been protected in the era of austerity, whereas there have 
been significant cuts to the benefits for the working age population. These trends have led to 
interest in the power of the ‘grey vote’ and even claims of ‘gerontocracy’. Some 
commentators have speculated that age may become ‘the new class’ in British politics.2  
In this article, we contrast the ‘cultural backlash’ or values-based explanation for older 
voters’ political preferences with political economy explanations of the age divide in politics 
that stress the inter-relationship of cultural and economic factors, and the importance – 
occupational and spatial – of the relationship of different groups of voters to the dynamic 
sectors and centres of the global knowledge economy.3 We challenge the view that, whether 
by reason of generational values or economic geography, older voters should be considered 
predominantly ‘left behind’. Instead, we provide evidence that older voters have increasingly 
distinct material interests that are visible in their political preferences. In particular, we 
examine the link between home ownership, age and voting, showing that, in line with 
theories of ‘patrimonial economic voting’, older homeowners have become a large and 
hitherto consistently Conservative voting bloc in UK general elections. Older voters also 
share welfare state preferences that are related to their position in the lifecycle, but social 
class differences emerge between home owning older voters and those living in rented 
accommodation in their support for economic intervention and the value of the state pension. 
We show how both the differences between older voters, and their commonalities of interests 
and preferences, can contribute to our understanding of the age divides manifested in the 
Brexit referendum and 2017 general election votes. We conclude with some thoughts on the 
development of a political economy of older voters in the UK. 
The rise of the ‘grey vote’ 
In common with other developed countries, the population of the UK is ageing as a result of 
increased life expectancy and the demographic bulge caused by the so-called ‘baby boomer’ 
generation. The ageing of the parliamentary electorate has also been accompanied by an 
increase in the proportion of older voters in the eligible voter population because of inward 
migration to the UK in recent decades from the EU and elsewhere of young people who are 
not entitled to vote in general elections.4 In a previous analysis of the Labour Force Survey 
(LFS) we found that in 2017, over 55s were 38% of the resident adult population but 39.9% 
of the electorate and over 65s, 23% and 24.5%, respectively.5 
The growing relative weight of older people in the voting-age population is coupled with 
considerable inequalities in voter turnout by age. A large age difference in turnout first 
opened up in the early 1990s and it has persisted in recent general elections. Despite much 
speculation that Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party had benefited from a ‘youthquake’ at the 
2017 general election, recent studies have suggested that there was no substantial change in 
turnout by age between the 2015 and 2017 general elections.6 Turnout at the 2017 general 
election among over 55s was 83.35%, compared to 58.15% of those under 55; and 84.34% 
vs. 63.06% for over and under 65s respectively. If we assume that both turnout and the 
proportion of those not entitled to vote due to their nationality remain constant, demographic 
change will mean that over 55s constitute over half of the voting public by 2020.7  
Yet the power of older voters is only likely to be significant if their preferences and vote 
choices differ substantially from the rest of the electorate. Recent evidence suggests this is 
indeed the case. In both the Brexit referendum and the 2017 general election, there were very 
considerable differences in voting according to age. Using British Election Study (BES) data, 
Tables 1 and 2 show how each age group voted in the Brexit referendum and the 2017 
general election respectively.  
Table 1: EU referendum vote by age group (n=1695; non-voters excluded; self-reported vote 
weights) 
EU referendum 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ Total 
Remain 59.1% 59.2% 46.2% 38.7% 49.7% 
Leave 40.9% 40.8% 53.8% 61.3% 50.3% 
 
Table 2: 2017 general election vote by age group (n=1616; non-voters excluded; self-
reported vote weights) 
2017 vote 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ Total 
Labour 60.0% 45.8% 40.3% 26.3% 41.0% 
Conservatives 26.7% 35.7% 41.2% 62.1% 43.5% 
Lib Dems 7.5% 10.5% 7.8% 5.4% 7.6% 
Other 5.8% 8.1% 10.7% 6.3% 7.9% 
 
The 2017 general election was the most polarised by age since at least 1970. To understand 
this sharpening of the age divide in the 2017 general election, we can focus on the BES 
Internet Panel data from 2014-2018. We treat each wave as a cross-section, containing a 
sample of more than 27,000 respondents and weighted by specific weights for each wave.  
Figure 1 shows the probability of intending to vote Conservative by age group (indexed to 
February 2014) across the 14 waves collected in the panel. Individuals without a voting 
intention are excluded to make election waves and non-election waves more comparable. The 
data shows that between February 2014 (Wave 1) and the post-general election survey in 
May 2015 (Wave 6), there was a slight increase in polarisation by age group. All age groups 
became more likely to vote Conservative but the increase was largest among over 65s, 
followed by 50-64 year olds.  
  
Figure 1: Probability of intending to vote Conservative (of those with a voting intention) by 
age indexed to February 2014 (Wave 1) until May 2018 (Wave 14). Source: BES Internet 
Panel Waves 1-14 
The age divide in political preferences then sharpens considerably in Wave 9, precisely after 
the 23rd June 2016 Brexit referendum. The probability of voting Conservative rises for all 
groups but does so much more significantly for the 50-64s and the over 65s. There is then a 
shallow drop off in support for the Conservatives during the 2017 general election campaign, 
particularly for the youngest age group. 
Explaining the age divide – ‘cultural backlash’? 
While age has long been an important factor in British politics, the 2017 general election 
marked an unprecedented level of polarisation. There is an obvious hypothesis for this, which 
is that 2017 was a ‘Brexit election’ – an issue on which, as we have seen, voters are also 
deeply polarised by age.8  Support for the Conservative Party rose markedly amongst older 
Leave voters, assisted by the collapse of UKIP support, while Labour increased its vote share 
amongst working age Remain voters significantly more than it did amongst Leave voters.9   
It is the importance of the Brexit vote that leads many to explain age differences in voting by 
reference to a “cultural backlash” – the title of an important recent work by Ronald Inglehart 
and Pippa Norris.10 The cultural backlash thesis maintains that recent ‘populist’ votes such as 
Brexit represent a conservative reaction against the ‘silent revolution’ in the cultural values of 
advanced societies like the UK towards social liberalism. Western societies have become 
more socially liberal on many issues and this has stimulated a backlash amongst voters 
holding authoritarian and conservative values. These values are strongest amongst older birth 
cohorts, particularly the interwar generation. In post-industrial areas characterised by low 
income and high unemployment, the authoritarian reflex against cultural change is 
accelerated by economic insecurity; material hardship sharpens the appeal of authoritarian-
populist actors and anti-immigrant, anti-elite sentiments. But fundamentally, it is cultural 
values, not class or economics that explains the age differences in vote choice. 
Indicators for both socially conservative cultural values and policy preferences do indeed 
show a strong correlation with voting for Brexit and the Conservative Party at the 2017 
general election, reinforcing the argument that the values and vote choice are fundamentally 
related to each other.11 However, these values and preferences can be due to ageing, period 
and cohort effects.12 Older generations are indeed more Eurosceptic and/or authoritarian 
(cohort effect), whether because they grew up in a more conservative and a less globalised 
era outside of the European Union or because of compositional characteristics such as having 
lower levels of education, which is a consistent predictor of more authoritarian values. On the 
other hand, individuals also tend to get more Eurosceptic, conservative and authoritarian as 
they get older (ageing effect), and when it comes to vote choice, period or time effects - for 
example, prevailing macro-economic conditions - matter considerably to political outcomes. 
In one recent study of attitudes towards the EU since the early 1960s, by Eichengreen et al, 
period effects swamp both cohort and ageing effects.13 Grasso et al even find that once they 
account for the compositional characteristics of different cohorts as well as period and ageing 
effects, older generations are actually less authoritarian14. Thus, while the cultural values of 
older voters are clearly an important part of the story, identifying their root cause as a 
generational cultural backlash is at the very least contestable. 
Economic geography, education and the knowledge economy 
A more fundamental challenge to the ‘cultural backlash’ theory comes from accounts that 
place the political economy of the transition to the digitalised knowledge economy at the 
heart of the new ‘cultural’ divisions. In their latest work, Torben Iversen and David Soskice 
argue that advanced capitalism’s primary asset is specialised knowledge, which is embedded 
in the social networks of co-located, highly educated, and relatively immobile skill clusters15. 
The process of skill agglomeration in post-industrial economies means that urban centres that 
attract young, well-educated people expand and thrive, while towns and rural areas that are 
disproportionately old and lower skilled are left behind. This leads to the emergence of 
distinct winners and losers, formed along geographical, age and educational cleavages: the 
winners are the young, educated workers in the urban knowledge economy, while the losers 
are older, lower skilled workers of the post-industrial towns and counties. Authoritarian 
cultural values of the older population derive from this economic reality, as do the liberal, 
cosmopolitan views of younger people: ‘postmaterialists’ and ‘populists’ are “rooted in 
different parts of the modern economy and it is impossible to detach their values from this 
underlying reality”.16 
A similar approach is taken by Jennings & Stoker who relate economic decline in English 
and Welsh constituencies to a long-term shift towards voting Conservative. Places that have 
experienced relative decline have become more ‘closed’, while those that have enjoyed 
growth in the knowledge economy have become more liberal and ‘open’. The Conservatives 
have seen their vote share rise in the former; Labour in the latter.17 
These accounts usefully reject unhelpful dichotomies between ‘culture’ and ‘economics’. But 
as they ground cultural values and political preferences in the material interests, occupations 
and economic geography produced by the transition from the industrial or Fordist economy to 
the knowledge economy, they tend to associate older voters with ‘left behind’ areas and/or 
industrial occupations. This is hard to reconcile with the substantial evidence of the relative 
economic prosperity of older voters in the UK: their historically high levels of housing and 
pension wealth, and the increase in their living standards in recent decades, particularly when 
compared to younger people in the period since the financial crisis in 2008.18 Large numbers 
of Conservative supporting older voters live in some of the most prosperous and wealthy 
parts of the UK, as indeed do substantial numbers of Leave voters. This will be disguised if 
‘age’ is itself entered as a variable for the measurement of relative decline or the ‘left behind’ 
economy i.e. if older voters’ values and vote choices are taken to be shaped by their 
(geographical) economic position, which is itself in part determined by reference to the age of 
the workforce or local population.  
We can tease some of these issues out by looking at the independent effect of age on voting 
once accounting for education and economic geography. As Figure 2 shows, in the EU 
referendum, graduates were more likely to vote Remain at all ages, although older people 
were slightly less divided by education. Given the considerable compositional differences in 
educational attainment across age groups – in the BES weighted sample, approximately 43% 
of 21-54 year olds had at least an undergraduate degree versus 28% of over 55s – this 
explains some, though not all, of the age effect in the Brexit referendum. However, while 
graduates were also less likely to vote Conservative at the 2017 general election, Figure 2 
shows that this appears to be entirely driven by an age effect, as there is no statistically 
significant difference between graduates and non-graduates at a given age. Thus, regardless 
of whether higher education is perceived as an entry ticket to the knowledge economy or a 
process of socialisation that engenders libertarian values, it cannot fully account for the age 
divide in relation to Brexit, and explains very little in terms of the probability of voting 
Conservative.  
Focusing directly on the economic geography of the knowledge economy, we can examine 
how an area’s integration into the global knowledge economy affects voting patterns. We 
identify high-skilled knowledge-intensive industries as the following sectors: Professional, 
Scientific and Technical Activities, Financial and Insurance Activities and Information and 
Communication, following the work of Anne Wren.19 Thus, areas that have a high proportion 
of individuals employed in those sectors can be assumed to be well-integrated into the global 
knowledge economy. This measure is negatively correlated with the age of a constituency: 
younger areas are more likely to have more people employed in high-skilled knowledge-
intensive industries. However, as with education and age at the individual-level, we want to 
separate out the independent effects of the age of a constituency and the extent to which it is 
integrated into the global knowledge economy.  
Figure 3 shows that – once we account for the age of a constituency – areas with more high-
skilled knowledge-intensive industries were more likely to vote Conservative in greater 
numbers. This relationship was strongest in older constituencies, with the very youngest 
constituencies equally unlikely to vote Conservative, regardless of their sectoral composition. 
This runs counter to the interpretation of support for the Conservatives at the 2017 general 
election coming from older voters in left-behind areas: older areas with a high proportion of 
individuals employed in knowledge-intensive industries were more likely to vote 
Conservative. However, the EU referendum tells a different story: areas with more high-
skilled knowledge-intensive industries were less likely to vote Leave and this relationship 
was strongest in younger areas.20 It is a similar picture if we look at the swing towards the 
Conservatives between 2015 and 2017. This lends support to the conclusion that Jennings and 
Stoker have reached that the 2017 general election was a ‘tilting’ of the political axis but not 
a realignment.21 Brexit led to an increase in support for the Conservatives in ‘left-behind’ 
areas but this was not enough to balance out existing divisions. Importantly though, the age 
of a constituency has a clear effect on voting patterns, independent of its integration into the 
globalised knowledge economy, particularly at the 2017 general election. 
 
 Figure 2: Probability of voting Leave in the 2016 EU referendum and voting Conservative in 
the 2017 general election by age and qualifications. Source: BES 2017 post-election survey 
 
Figure 3: Predicted Conservative vote share 2017 and Leave vote share 2016 by the 
proportion of over 65s in a constituency and the log of the % of individuals employed in high-
skilled knowledge-intensive sectors. Source: ONS 
Housing, the welfare state and age  
These results suggest that we need to develop a fuller political economy explanation of the 
age divides in the electorate and, in particular, the interests of older voters in their economic 
and social security. In the rest of this piece, we focus on two aspects of this question: housing 
wealth and pensions. Cohort effects in the accumulation of housing wealth have led to very 
high rates of home ownership – above 75% - amongst the current generation of over ‘65s. In 
economic policy preferences, consistent with ‘patrimonial’ voting theory, this may predispose 
older people to vote for parties that they perceive will protect the value of housing assets in 
the economy, or conversely leave untaxed their housing wealth. We might then expect to see 
social class differences emerge in the preferences of older voters depending on whether they 
rent or own their own properties.  
Second, older voters have shared interests in the protection of their welfare state entitlements 
– that is, to maintaining the real terms value of the Basic State Pension and older people’s 
allowances, as well as protecting spending on the public services upon which they rely 
disproportionately, such as the National Health Service. This is indeed what has happened to 
public spending in the period of austerity since 2010. Again, some social class differences 
might be expected to emerge here, given the relative dependence of low-income pensioners 
on state provision, but we might expect older voters to have shared welfare preferences that 
distinguish them from younger and middle aged voters. 
Housing & Home Ownership 
In their recent Political Quarterly article on the relationship between house prices, housing 
markets and vote choice, Ansell and Adler find a strong correlation between home 
ownership, age and voting Conservative at the 2017 general election: ‘whereas among renters 
(in private and social housing) age is essentially unrelated to vote choice, among homeowners 
there is a striking difference of around 30 per cent as we move from people in their twenties 
to people in their eighties’.22 The authors explain the fact that age increases the likelihood of 
voting Conservative for homeowners by pointing to the varying levels of equity that 
individuals will have at different points in their life. Older people are more likely to own a 
large share of their property or own it outright. They have more housing wealth than young 
people and less risk of negative equity.  
Using the BES post-election cross-sectional surveys from 1970, we explore the interaction 
between housing tenure and age for all the general elections in this period, and find that the 
picture has been relatively similar since 1979: older renters tend not to vote Conservative 
much more than younger renters, while older homeowners are a clearly more dependable 
constituency vis-à-vis younger homeowners. 
 Figure 4: Probability of voting Conservative by age group (18-54; 55+) and housing tenure 
(owner; renter) 1970-2017 
However, although this pattern may be relatively consistent since the 1970s, the relative size 
of homeowners and renters in different age cohorts has changed considerably. Using data 
analysed by the Resolution Foundation from the Family Expenditure Survey prior to 1984, 
and Labour Force Survey for subsequent years, Figure 5 shows homeownership rates for 
different age groups between 1961 and 2017. The proportion of over 65s who are 
homeowners has increased continually since 1970 and it now stands at over 75%. 
 Figure 5: Home-ownership rates by age group of household. Source: Resolution Foundation, 
FES 1961-1983, LFS 1984-2017 
This is largely driven by generational differences: baby boomers were able to get on the 
housing ladder and buy housing cheaply in their youth, amassing housing wealth during the 
long asset boom that started in the 1970s.  
The importance of housing wealth to the older vote also runs counter to the argument of a 
spatial divide between left-behind and prosperous areas. As with individual-level data, there 
is an interaction between the rates of home-ownership in a constituency and the age of the 
constituency in predicting voting patterns. Figure 6 shows that a higher median age of a 
constituency has a greater effect on the predicted Conservative vote share at the 2017 election 
in constituencies that also have high rates of home-ownership. Thus, older constituencies 
with lower rates of home-ownership are not as likely to vote Conservative.  
 Figure 6: Predicted Conservative vote share at 2017 general election by median age of 
constituency and rates of home ownership. Source: ONS 
Finally, Figure 7 shows the effect of age and housing tenure on two different dimensions of 
politics – the authoritarian-libertarian axis and the interventionist-market axis– using data 
from the BES post-election survey in 2017. It shows that regardless of housing tenure, age 
increases the extent to which individuals express authoritarian preferences. However, it also 
shows that age only reduces support for economic interventionism for homeowners.    
 
 
Figure 7: Predicted values on authoritarianism and interventionism index by age and 
housing tenure. Source: BES post-election survey 2017 
The Welfare State  
Another interpretation of the independent effect of age is that position in the life cycle shapes 
the priorities an individual gives to different elements of the welfare state. The old will prefer 
a greater emphasis on healthcare and pensions spending and the young will prefer education 
and childcare spending due to their immediate respective needs. In conditions of austerity, 
when services and social security benefits are being cut, voters may be forced to choose 
between these welfare preferences. 
Cross-sectional analysis shows that there are indeed differences in preferences across age 
groups that fit the life-cycle hypothesis.23 However, observed differences in preferences by 
age based on cross-sectional studies can result from both cohort and lifecycle effects. Across 
21 years and 22 countries, Sørensen finds that life-cycle effects are relatively modest as older 
generations value pensions more and education less than younger generations, which 
accounts for a large proportion of the observed differences in age groups.24  
However, in the UK, we find mixed results for the idea that austerity opened up a new inter-
generational conflict in attitudes to the welfare state. Using repeated cross-sections from 
British Social Attitudes data between 1999-2015, we examine support for more spending on 
retired people across different age groups (Figure 8). Contrary to our expectation that the 
politics of crisis and austerity would widen the age divide, the differences between younger 
people (18-34 year olds) and other age groups that existed between 1999 and 2008 shrunk 
after the financial crisis, and then disappeared as middle-aged and older people reduced their 
support for more spending on retired people by a considerable amount. This may be due to 
‘thermostat’ dynamics, as increased government support for pensioners reduces the demand 
for more spending. Yet there is no clear reason why a proportionately greater reduction in 
demand would be seen among those with lifecycle interests in sustaining spending on retired 
people. 
 Figure 8: Probability of being in favour of spending more on retired people by age group 
between 1999 and 2015. Source: British Social Attitudes 
However, studies show that when individuals are forced to prioritise among different 
spending items, a greater age divide appears, with older people more inclined to shift 
resources to pensions, while younger people want more resources for unemployment 
beneﬁts.25 The BES Internet Panel Wave 13, conducted after the 2017 general election, 
includes a question tailored to explore such trade-offs and intended to relate to the ‘Triple 
Lock’ policy of the Coalition and Conservative governments, which guarantees that the Basic 
State Pension increases at the rate of inflation, the average rise in wages or 2.5%, whichever 
is highest. Table 3 shows the responses by age group to the idea that pensions should increase 
even if average wages and prices are not going up. There are very clear age differences in the 
responses, with the highest levels of support amongst the over 65s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Responses to ‘Triple Lock’ question by age group. Source: BES Internet Panel Wave 
13  
Pensions should increase even if 
average wages and prices aren’t 
going up 
 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ All 
Strongly disagree 5.8% 4.6% 2.2% 1.0% 3.5% 
Disagree 23.0% 21.8% 19.9% 16.1% 20.4% 
Neither 23.1% 25.8% 25.5% 27.2% 25.3% 
Agree 23.2% 27.4% 31.1% 33.8% 28.6% 
Strongly agree 6.2% 10.7% 17.9% 20.1% 13.3% 
Don’t Know 18.8% 9.8% 3.6% 1.8% 8.9% 
 
Figure 9 shows that, while there is greater support for the triple lock policy among older 
people in general, it is particularly pronounced among older renters. As with the differences 
between homeowners and renters in vote choice, this suggests that there are important social 
class differences amongst older voters in their welfare state preferences. 
 
 
Figure 9: Predicted level of support (1-5) for the ‘Triple Lock’ policy by age and housing 
tenure (DK excluded). Source: BES Internet Panel Wave 13 
 Towards a Political Economy of Older Voters? 
In much of the analysis of both the Brexit referendum and the 2017 general election, the 
votes of older people have been considered largely reactionary, as an expression either of 
socially conservative values pitted against the liberalism and cosmopolitanism of younger 
voters, or the perspective of people living in places in decline and ‘left behind’. Relatively 
little attention has been paid to whether older voters have distinct interests and political 
preferences by virtue of their position in the lifecycle and/or the material circumstances of the 
particular cohorts to which they belong. In this article, we have explored the material interests 
of older voters, showing – in line with ‘patrimonial’ or asset ownership economic choices – 
that home owners aged over 65, who make up over 75% of their age cohort, have strong and 
consistent preferences for voting Conservative. These older homeowners share socially 
conservative values with their peers that increase with age, but they are less committed to 
economic intervention and to defence of the Basic State Pension that those older voters in 
rented accommodation. Older voters are thus both united and divided across social class 
lines.  
We have also shown that areas that are well integrated into the knowledge economy were 
more likely to vote Conservative in 2017 as the proportion of older voters in the local 
electorate increased. If there was a ‘tilting’ of the political axis in the Brexit referendum and 
its aftermath, this was more pronounced in younger areas: older areas were likely to vote 
Leave regardless of their sectoral composition. Thus, the combination of a preference for 
leaving the EU with voting Conservative in 2017 may indicate that a substantial number of 
older voters are relatively ‘insulated’ from the economic turbulence of Brexit by their 
material wealth and secure incomes, rather than simply registering ‘cultural’ choices on the 
one hand, or economic disadvantage, on the other. Meanwhile, social class differences 
between older homeowners and renters usefully help explain why older voters who voted 
Leave in 2016 did not all switch to voting Conservative in 2017 (and which may yet be 
visible in support for the Brexit Party in any future general election). 
Evidence from the Bank of England, as well as research institutes such as the Institute for 
Fiscal Studies and the Resolution Foundation, has found that older people have benefited 
disproportionately from both monetary and fiscal policy in the post-financial crisis era.26. 
Older homeowners have seen their housing and pension wealth increase as a result of 
Quantitative Easing, while the austerity enacted by the Coalition and Conservative 
governments has given relative protection to the social security entitlements enjoyed by older 
people at the expense of those of the working age population. Thus, while the turbulence of 
recent political events has created many ‘supply side’ explanations for political change – and 
opened up considerable space in which challenger parties can operate – the ‘demand-side’ of 
voters’ preferences has focused too much on the cultural values of older voters and ‘left 
behind’ places, and not enough on the relative prosperity of the older population and the 
means by which they have secured their economic interests since the financial crisis. In an 
ageing society, in which rising numbers of people live for longer periods in retirement, 
political economic explanations of older people’s policy preferences need to pay more 
attention to their distinct interests, and how political parties respond to these. 
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